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Abstract 
During the 1990s, a series of institutional transformations took place that strongly affected the national 
productive structure, as well as its agents. Among the main effects of the new openness and liberalization 
policies are: the loss of relevance of the manufacturing sector in the economy, the abandonment of the 
complex system of tariffs and subsidies and the accelerated growth of foreign direct investment. How 
have these transformations impacted the structure of national industrial business groups? This is the 
central question that guides the article. 
The paper takes two samples from large industrial business groups in the late 1980s and in 2015, 
comparing their evolution in both benchmark years. In the construction of both samples, information 
was taken from the Central Bank of Uruguay, the Montevideo Stock Exchange, Official Newspaper and 
press sources, in addition to previous work.   
The evidence presented shows that aspects such as size, level of diversification and the form of family 
control have not varied much in each period. In this sense, the groups have remained stable around 
certain attributes. On the other hand, there are notable variations in the formation of alliances, the sector 
distribution of the business portfolio and the links with the government in different modalities. 
These variations and permanence can be explained by the impact of the new institutional context in the 
framework of a small economy like Uruguay. Although similar reforms in other countries in the region 
have strengthened national business groups (promoting their internationalization and their internal 
expansion into new business areas), the Uruguayan case seems to represent the opposite. In this way, 
the paper contributes to the discussion about family groups and their adaptation to the context of the 
second globalization in peripheral economies. 
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1. Introduction 
In the late 1980s, manufacturing activity was a core area in the business portfolio of the main 
Uruguayan business groups (Stolovich, Rodríguez and Bértola 1987). These groups had 
consolidated under the framework of the import substitution industrialization model (ISI), 
which sheltered their businesses in a strongly protected economy (Jacob 1991; Trías 1961). At 
the end of the 80s, 82% of the large groups of the national economy participated in the 
ownership of at least one industrial company. 
Economic opening and liberalization policies adopted by the Uruguayan government in the 
1990s modified the national productive structure, reducing the importance of the 
manufacturing. The foreign capital increased its presence, first in the 1990s, then strongly after 
2005, displacing national capital in some key economic sectors, including private banking. The 
transformations that affected the national economy and its agents call for an assessment of the 
status of national business groups.  
As much of the literature has highlighted, business groups are business structures with a high 
capacity to absorb and adapt to changes in context (Khanna and Yafeh 2007; Leff 1978). The 
changes in the structure of the groups are largely explained by the implementation of this 
adaptive capacity (Peres 1998; Barbero 2011; Acosta and Londoño 2003; Colpan and Hikino 
2016). The institutional context is, therefore, a decisive variable to understand the future of the 
structure of business groups and their strategies. But the set of institutions that influence 
economic performance act on a certain structure and previous trajectory (Greif 2006). The 
effects of secular market-focused institutions may be dissimilar to national agents in one 
economy or another. 
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The Uruguayan case presented here reinforces this hypothesis. The impact of opening and 
liberalization policies in the framework of a small economy and with lagging relative 
productivity, affect the possibilities of insertion of business groups in this new scenario. 
Changes in economic structure are absorbed as a way to adapt to the new economic 
environment. Hence, your business portfolio is modified. However, the loss of participation of 
the groups in some key sectors of the economy (among them the financial system) and the 
advance of foreign capital in those sectors, have affected the survival capacity of national 
groups as major players in the business. Unlike other national cases such as Mexico, Chile, 
Colombia or Brazil, the Uruguayan case shows a negative effect of the structural reforms of the 
90s on national business groups (Peres 1998; Hoshino 2010; Jones and Lluch 2011). This 
uniqueness is part of its appeal when thinking about future comparative studies. 
This article is divided in four sections. The second section develops the methodology used to 
compare the structure of industrial business groups at the end of the 1980s and to the present. 
The third section aims contextualize the deindustrialization process undergone by the country, 
the characteristics of foreign direct investment (FDI) and its impacts of them in the structure 
economy. The fourth section develops the main argument of the study, in terms evolution of 
the structure of industrial business groups according to six variables: firm size, forms of 
organization and control, sectoral structure, level of diversification, alliance development, and 
Governmental linkages. Studies on business groups for the Uruguayan case are almost non-
existent after the 80s1, so this work and especially this section, constitute an important empirical 
contribution to national historiography. In the last section the conclusions of the work are 
                                                          
1 The latest systematic general studies on the economy as a whole were coordinated by economist Luis Stolovich 
(Stolovich, Rodríguez and Bértola 1987; Stolovich 1989, 1994). In recent times, only one study has addressed 
business groups, but its scope is limited to media groups (Lanza and Buqet 2011). 
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presented. There it can be seen that institutional changes have impacted some characteristics of 
the groups such as the structure of alliances, the sectorial distribution of their businesses, the 
level of unrelated diversification, and their income-obtaining strategy based on political 
linkages. However, other characteristics are maintained, such as the average size and the way 
of organization and control. 
2. Methodology 
The methodological strategy of this study is based on the comparison of industrial business 
groups in two periods: the late 1980s and from 2010 to 2015. We take as a business group the 
well-known definition of Khanna and Yafeh (2007).  
Different sources were taken into account for both periods to construct the business groups. For 
the late 1980s, we mainly used information from Stolovich, Rodríguez and Bértola (1987), 
which included data for 1985, in some cases complemented with data from Stolovich (1989, 
1993).  
For the recent period, we used as initial source data published by the Central Bank of Uruguay 
(BCU) in the Central Credit Risk Registry. To complement this information, research was 
conducted taking into account sources such as the press, company websites, Montevideo Stock 
Exchange reports, Official Gazette publications and National Registry of Commerce data, as 
well as information provided by qualified informants linked to the business world2. 
To make the information comparable, we started by identifying a set of 120 large industrial 
companies for each point, stratifying them based on sales. Different sources were used to 
construct both rankings. For the late 1980s, a study by Stolovich and Rodríguez (1988) was 
                                                          
2 See Geymonat (2019) for a thorough explanation about the methodological process used to construct the 2015 
business groups. 
 
Volume 5, Number 2, 150-176, July-December 2020           doi.org/10.1344/jesb2020.2.j079 
 
Online ISSN: 2385-7137                                                                                                      COPE Committee on Publication Ethics 
http://revistes.ub.edu/index.php/JESB  Creative Commons License 4.0      
154 
used. From this work, we used the data presented by the mentioned authors for the year 1987, 
disaggregating industrial companies from all the rest. 
For the second period, we used the microdata from 2010 Annual Economic Activity Survey 
(EAAE), provided by the National Statistics Institute (INE), and selected companies whose 
main activity was classified as part of the Manufacturing Industry Division. After stratifying 
the set of the main 120 companies according to sales, we proceeded to identify them because 
the microdata is anonymous. To this goal, we did crosstab data from the Permanent Register of 
Business Activity, also published by INE, and from Customs export data. Based on both 
rankings, we identified the integration of large companies into larger structures, such as 
business groups or transnational companies. 
Thus, we established two samples of industrial business groups. For the 1985-1989 period, the 
120 most important companies in the industry had links to 80 national groups, while in 2010-
2015 the industrial upper tier was linked to 58 groups. The decrease in the number of groups is 
largely explained by the increase in foreign capital in industrial company control, as discussed 
below. 
3. Uruguayan deindustrialization 
The 1980s reflected a period of crisis of the industrializing model in Uruguay, after a 
pronounced stagnation dating back to the 1950s, then were exercised some attempts to reorient 
the sector to export during the 1970s (Notaro 1985; Astori 1989). The beginning of this decline 
in the industry is showed in Figure 1. The proportion of industry in the Gross Domestic Product 
varies depending of current or constant currency. Although, in any case, it is clear that it was 
during the 1990s where the greatest decrease was made. 
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Figure 1. Proportion of the manufacturing industry in GDP at current and constant prices  
(1970 = 100) 
Source: Banco Central de Uruguay (BCU) y Montevideo Oxford Latin American Economic History Database 
(Moxlad). 
A series of liberalization and economic opening policies were established during this decade, 
resulting a net negative effect on the industrial sector that according to Rama (1990), Olesker 
(2001) and Finch (2005) depended to a great extent, on protectionist policies. The number of 
companies and the number of employees decreased during this decade. At the same time, and 
despite the fact that the industrial product remained stagnant, productivity grew because of a 
technological modernization process and elimination of lagging signatures. 
Table 1. Variation of companies, employees and industry performance 1988-1997 
 
Variation 1988-1997  
(%) 
Total industrial companies -42.3 
Companies with more than 5 employees -33.2 
Labor productivity 84.5 
Staff employed -42.9 
Physical volume 1.7 
Source: III y IV Censo Económico. Instituto Nacional de Estadística (INE). 
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The economic model established in the 1990s pushed to a deep economic crisis in Uruguay 
until 2002. From 2005 onwards there was a modification in the political scenario after the 
electoral triumph of a left-wing political coalition (named “Frente Amplio”). At the same time, 
the external conditions impacting clearly in Uruguay because the increase of prices of raw 
materials exported, which translated into important GDP growth rates –the most important of 
the country's economic history. The recovery that followed Uruguay after 2002 led to sustained 
industrial growth, although similar to the growth of the total economy. Therefore, the industrial 
sector continued to represent a portion of GDP similar to that of the previous decade. The 
distinctive features in terms of industrial policies of the 1990s were maintained and 
consolidated. Economic opening increased and domestic prices adjustment policies were not 
deployed. The market remained as the allocator of resources, and the industrial structure 
continued its course based on agribusinesses. The sectors linked to the primary sector presented 
comparative advantages and were able to remain successful and in expanding, while those 
focused on labor-intensive processes or linked to the domestic market declined. A group of 
"non-traditional" branch sectors should have an outstanding performance, protected –to a large 
extent– by regional and commercial integration based on trade agreements, such as Mercosur3. 
Some of these manufacturing sectors were synthetic rubber, plastics, basic chemicals or 
pharmaceuticals. 
  
                                                          
3 The Southern Common Market (Mercosur) is a regional integration treaty signed in 1994 by Argentina, Brazil, 
Paraguay and Uruguay. Among the agreements was the fixing of common tariffs, and the progressive reduction 
of tariffs for most of the products marketed among the bloc's member countries. 
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Figure 2. Industrial structure in percentage of manufacturing product 1978-2015 
Source: Own elaboration based on Encuesta industrial del Actividad (EIA), Encuesta Anual de Actividad 
Económica (EAAE) y Banco Central del Uruguay (BCU). 
Table 2. Manufacturing product in Uruguay, according to the main type of input used and the 































17.5 8.8 9.2 
Imported 
Imputs (%) 
29.7 12.3 0.0 
Imported 
Imputs 
3.9 21.0 3.3 
Source: Bértola and Bittencourt (2013) 
Note: for 1985 a set of branches equivalent to 7.9% of the manufacturing product were not classified. 
The transformations in the size of the industrial sector and average unit size led to increased 
sectorial concentration. Measured as the ratio between the sales of the 100 largest companies 
and total industrial sales, this level went from 0.55% in 1986 according to Buxedas (1992) to 
0.68% in 2010. Most importantly, and especially after 2005, there was a sharp expansion of 
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foreign capital in the sector, in line with an increased FDI over the national economy as a whole. 
Between 2006 and 2016, the average annual FDI, as proportion of GDP, was around 4.6%, with 
a strong growth of capital from the region (mainly Brazil and Argentina). This number is quite 
high, considering that in 1970-2000 the same ratio was 0.6% (Reig 2013). An analysis of the 
120 main industrial companies in 1987 and 2010 will reveal that this sector was no exception 
(see Table 3). 
Table 3. Property of the 120 main manufacturing companies 
 National Foreing 
Associated  
(national and foreing) 
Total 
1987 20 16 84 120 
2010 50 12 58 120 
Source: Own elaboration based on EAAE 2010 microdata, Stolovich and Rodríguez (1988), press sources and 
qualified informants. 
As suggested Shaick (2006), foreign capital would tend to be a modernizing agent, operating 
with greater technological endowment, and presenting higher levels of productivity in a 
country. This, and its presence in sectors having comparative advantages could explain its high 
level of participation in the operating surplus, suggesting that large foreign industrial companies 
have high levels of profitability compared to domestic ones (see Table 4). 
Table 4.  Participation on different variables of the main 120 industrial companies according to 
origin of capital (in %) 
 Foreing (and associated) National 
Output value of production 49.01 50.99 
Gross value added 52.03 47.97 
Staff employed 48.62 51.38 
Capital stock 62.28 37.72 
Operating surplus 67.84 32.16 
Source: Own elaboration based on EAAE 2010 microdata. 
An increased foreign influence would tend to displace domestic capital from some branches of 
the economy. This is confirmed by the recent performance of national economy, because of 
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100% of private banking is owned by foreigners and more than 70% of exports are carried out 
by these companies. 
4. Changes in the structure of domestic industrial business groups 
It is possible to assume that Uruguayan groups have undergone significant changes in their 
structure in the face of events such as the loss of relative importance of industry, its own 
structural transformation, and the new flow of FDI. In this section, we propose to analyze this 
issue based on some variables that have been highlighted by the literature (Colpan, Hikino and 
Lincoln 2010; Khanna and Yafeh 2007; Granovetter 2005) and for which we have been able to 
compile data. 
4.1 Family control and horizontal organization 
When we approach to main business groups in Uruguay during the years selected, we found 
that most correspond to family groups. To define a group as a family group, we considered the 
participation of more than one family member (by blood or marriage) in the boards of the 
companies and/or the existence of inheritance mechanisms and generational transferences in 
their history4. 
Based on this, we identified in 2015 that 45 were family groups from 58 total groups. From 
total of 13, two clearly were cases of non-family groups, and 11 did not presented a clear family 
imprint. In some of those cases the groups were controlled by a single entrepreneur but not by 
another member of his family. It makes impossible to identify in a specific way the factor (or 
factors) behind the replacement or alternance of the leader or the intergenerational continuity. 
                                                          
4 A similar criterion was adopted by Almaraz and Ramírez (2018), and by Fernández and Lluch (2015), when 
referring to business families. 
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It is likely that some of these seemingly non-family groups are actually family groups. 
Therefore, it is also likely that the relative imprint of family groups is underestimated. 
Outstanding to this lack of information, the percentage of family groups in the late 1980s could 
vary between 77% and 90% of total groups that were identified. Both in the 1980s and 
nowadays, the family structure of most groups follows a single-lineage, nuclear family pattern. 
There are few cases where one or more nuclear families are combined with other relatives 
constituting extend family business or composed family business as explained by Almaraz 
(2018, 82). 
Another characteristic of these industrial groups is their horizontal organization. The 
organization of national groups is more similar to a loose network form, where there is no 
control over a group entities by a set of parental or differentiated companies, we found that 
unicity and coordination is based on direct participation by family members in different firms 
that making up the group (Jones and Colpan 2010, 84-85). This form of organization has been 
a constant throughout the history of national groups, with few exceptions. From 111 groups 
studied by Stolovich, Rodríguez and Bértola (1987), only one of them displayed a pyramidal 
structure with a holding company (hard core) participating in the other entities. By 2015, this 
type of structure was visible in a single group, although it was not a family group. 
4.2 Size 
Another important variant is the size of the groups, here we consider the number of connected 
companies that can be an approximate measure to understand the structure size, before to 
analyze the economic power of each group. Although in some cases the number of controlled 
companies and the magnitude of controlled capital matches, this is not a rule. Table 5 shows 
for 1985 and 2015 the national industrial groups according to the average size related to the 
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number of companies controlled. Differences founded suggest us that an upward reading over 
the period. However, it is likely the number of connected companies in the 1985 groups was 
underestimated. Mainly, because of the way in which agricultural firms5 are accounted for. 
Therefore, it can be concluded that average group size has not changed substantially during the 
period studied. 
Table 5. Size of national business groups in number of companies in Uruguay (1985-2015) 
 1985 2015 
Mean 6.8 7.5 
Median 6 6 
Maximum 26 36 
Minimum 2 2 
1st quartile 3 4 
3rd quartile 8 9 
Total of groups over the 120 most important companies 80 58 
Source: Own elaboration based on Stolovich, Rodríguez and Bértola (1987) and Geymonat (2019). 
This data is still striking. It gives an account of a structure that, in general terms, has not 
advanced in its complexity. It is even possible to notice that their size does not seem to have 
changed strongly in at least sixty years. From a sample of 20 industrial groups, reconstructed 
based on the data extracted from a work by Trías (1961) for the 1950s, we can observe similar 
values: an average of 7.8, a minimum value of 2 and a maximum of 21 for the set of cases taken. 
This stagnation in size may be part of the explanation of the low variability in the forms of 
organization and control of national groups (see section 4.1). As there is no growth in 
productive units and business diversification (see section 4.3), the incentives to advance in more 
complex organizational forms do not exist. 
                                                          
5 Stolovich, Rodríguez and Bértola (1987) includes several references to land tenure, without specifying the 
number of firms. In our study, we identified agricultural firms by company name. 
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What elements explain this stagnation in the size of national industrial groups? A first guess 
has to do with the size of the national economy. It is small, with a reduced domestic market 
(3,300,000 inhabitants in 2015). This aspect affects the scale of the firms and with it the 
possibilities of accumulating capital and expanding to other sectors and / or regions. 
Another aspect that affects the size of the groups has to do with reforms in the economic 
institutions during the 1990s. This set of reforms has opened the national economy to 
competition of imported goods, as well as inflow of foreign capital. In different ways, this new 
scenario generates several incentives for the specialization of activities. In the first place, the 
economic opening allows the export development of some sectors, removing the restrictions to 
the growth of the size of the internal market. This means that accumulating capital and growth 
can be achieved in the same sector, and not only through expansion into other activities. On the 
other hand, the possibility of importing inputs without restrictions reduces the need for firms to 
create subsidiaries to produce these items. Finally, in a scenario of total foreign control of the 
national private banking sector, part of the possibilities of obtaining capital for the groups 
consists of selling assets and companies. This situation has meant that several groups reduce 
their number of companies by concentrating capital in those with greater possibilities of 
development.  
Unlike other countries in the region, in Uruguay the period of opening and liberalization did 
not advance in the privatization of public companies. Therefore, there were no opportunities 
for business in these areas either. At the same time, national companies were not large enough 
to launch themselves into conquering regional markets and becoming trans-Latin American, a 
phenomenon that did occur in countries such as Chile, Mexico and Brazil. 
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4.3 Diversification patterns 
The integration of related activities is follows different strategies, either horizontally (when 
companies are controlled in the same productive or commercial phase) or vertically (when 
different links in the same value chain are integrated). The first kind of related integration tends 
to follow an expansion strategy for dominating the same market. Vertical integration responds 
to other specific needs. This kind of diversification may be aimed at controlling certain strategic 
stages of the business, either because they are concentrated links, with the possibility of setting 
prices backward or forward, or simply because they imply a higher turnover. Controlling 
strategic inputs, or those that have a certain specificity, appears to be another reason for groups 
to diversify vertically (Chandler 1987; Hopkings and Wallerstein 1994; Williamson 1985). 
Table 6. Business groups in Uruguay, with unrelated diversification in 1985 and 2015 
 1985 2015 
Diversified groups in more than one value chain 39 32 
Total analyzed (%) 55 55 
Average value chains of groups with unrelated diversification 3.3 2.8 
Median value chains of groups with unrelated diversification 3 2 
Source: Own elaboration based on Stolovich, Rodríguez and Bértola (1987) and Geymonat (2019). 
However, horizontal and vertical movements in the same value chain are not the only form of 
diversification. We will use the term unrelated diversification when referring to the coexistence 
of activities that are not technically or commercially related to each other. This type of 
diversification responds to other needs, also highlighted in the literature on business groups, 
resulting from institutional uncertainty, economic cycle variability, or the use of know-how 
acquired in previous activities, among other factors (Colpan, Hikino and Lincoln 2010; Khanna 
and Yafeh 2007; Barbero 2011). The uncertainty that characterizes peripheral economies, and 
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especially growth cyclicality and volatility, could explain this kind of expansion toward 
unrelated activities tending to diversify risks. 
The percentage of diversified groups in unrelated activities was stable over the period as show 
in Table 6. What seems to be decreasing, however, is the number of activities in which they 
diversify. This is consistent with what is expected in terms of the overall economic 
performance. In the 1980s, the Uruguayan economy was not characterized by an expansive 
phase of the economic cycle. Quite the opposite. The way in which individual capital expanded 
consisted largely in diversifying into other activities. At the same time, diversifying activities 
was a way of diversifying risk. The country's economic structure had been accumulating a set 
of tensions and contradictions resulting from its protected industrial structure and its productive 
backwardness. This set of contradictions foretold a change in economic policy, sooner or later. 
It is important to visualize this aspect as part of the incentive structure in place for industrial 
entrepreneurs at the time. In addition to volatility, there was the perception that the activity that 
was being increasingly questioned, and that without support its chances of success were 
uncertain. 
The 1990s were a turbulent decade when it came to changes in economic structure and the rules 
of the economic game within the national and regional space, leading to a new set of incentives. 
Maintaining a lagging industry was no longer a priority and the commercial and "technological 
update" was perceived as a prerequisite to continue operating in some sectors. It was also 
evident that several branches would have great difficulties in processing these transformations. 
In this context, it is likely that the existing business groups preferred to focus on their most 
profitable operations, liquidating those lagging behind or with fewer chances to integrate in the 
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new context. In parallel, the service sector began a relative expansion and diversification phase, 
offering attractive business opportunities. 
In this century, the arrival of large flows of FDI to the country encouraged asset sales that 
capitalized some national groups, especially those highly indebted to the financial system. This 
mechanism reinforced the existing trend to reduce unrelated diversification, promoting 
specialization in activities that began to show greater development prospects. Similarly, groups 
created and/or "emerging" in 2004-2015 did not benefit from strong incentives for unrelated 
diversification. Economic growth in the last decade may have allowed for constant surplus 
reinvestment in the same activity or value chain. 
4.4 Alliance structure 
By alliance we understand the convergence of different groups and/or businessmen in the 
control a company. An analysis of the tendency of national groups to make alliances among 
themselves or with other national entrepreneurs –either inside or outside the industry– reveals 
a decrease in this strategy at both the relative and absolute levels. This trend seems to be in line 
with the specialization process described above, where groups tend to concentrate in fewer 
activities. 
Table 7. Alliance structure of national groups in Uruguay, 1985-2015 
Alliance structure of national groups 1985 2015 
Groups maintaining alliances with other national groups or 
entrepreneurs (%) 
67 46 
Groups maintaining alliances with foreign companies (%) 35 32 
Source: Own elaboration based on Stolovich, Rodríguez and Bértola (1987) and Geymonat (2019). 
We identified three types of alliances according to their motivation. The first motivation for an 
alliance between different groups can respond to the need to reach (improve) the size that can 
be a necessary condition to operate in certain branches and upgrading. Another motivation to 
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seek alliances between groups can be more natural because responds to the existence of 
common strategic linkages as part of chains of production or distribution. This situation enables 
and sustains alliances around the control of certain inputs, secondary services connected to the 
main activity and access to credit. As we can see further, there are groups that combine both 
aspects. 
The development of more secular economic institutions would result in lower transaction costs, 
and thus in fewer incentives for developing alliances to controlling of the chains production and 
distribution but is not the case to the alliances to scale. This element should be more complex 
with the effect of the structural reforms adopted in the 1990s that affected the links of internal 
economy (Hirschman 1983). The possibility to obtaining imported inputs and services can 
produce productive delocalization processes and can affect the possibility of deploying the 
alliances to control chains.  An analysis of the main motivations for group alliances seems to 
corroborate this hypothesis as showed in Table 8 if we consider the importance of FDI is the 
las period. The underlying needs for alliances development for controlling strategic inputs and 
services have diminished. 
Table 8. Reasons that support alliances between national groups in Uruguay, 1985 and 2015 
Reasons that support alliances 1985 1985 (%) 2015 2015 (%) 
Scale 22 50 17 63 
Control of related activities 6 14 2 7 
Both 16 36 8 30 
Total 44 100 27 100 
Source: Own elaboration based on Stolovich, Rodríguez and Bértola (1987) and Geymonat (2019). 
Nevertheless, the national alliances with foreigners were relatively stable over the period as 
showed Table 7. In 1985, 35% of the industrial groups in Uruguay sharing the control with 
foreign companies. In 2015 this pathway was very similar (32%). The structural motivation that 
drives national capitals to seek this type of alliance is not very different from that which 
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supports the search for alliances between national capitals. The emphasis here is distributed 
between the possibility of capitalizing companies by adding a foreign partner, and the 
possibility of establishing alliances with capitals that provide technology or strategic inputs, or 
which have potential for market expansion (Stolovich, 1989). 
So far, we outlined some hypotheses regarding to the needs of driving national capital to seek 
an association with foreign capital in a context of high level of FDI. We should then ask the 
following question about the other side of the equation: Why would foreign capital be interested 
in partnering with a domestic counterpart? A possible answer can include several elements. 
First, in the context of a closed economy and a more incipient development of information and 
communication systems, and the weakness of global institutions to norm the FDI, the alliances 
with domestic capitals becomes an asset to deal with the local institutional framework. In one 
hand, the domestic groups, strong in the local economy and with a good portfolio of political 
connections, would act as an agent to reduce the transaction costs in a market characterized or 
marred with imperfections. On the other hand, minimizing costs or making economies of scale 
in face to common needs could be a motivation for the alliances with domestic actors in a stock 
of subsidiary and/or complementary activities linked to a core activity which is developed by 
foreign capitals. 
The paradox is that market imperfections were reduced, and the secular development of 
economic institutions were enhanced, the local agents should lose their advantage and their 
possibilities of internalizing key aspects to make alliances to begin their own growth. This 
seems to be the case if we analyze the alliances between foreign and domestic capitals in the 
industrial sector in both periods of our study. Considering exclusively the point of view of 
foreigners the results are showing in the Table 9. 
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Table 9. Foreign capital in alliances with Uruguayan capitals, 1985 and 2015 
 1985 2015 
A.- Foreign capitals maintaining alliances with domestic groups in 
large industrial companies 
18 14 
B.-Total foreign capital in large industrial companies 29 46 
Alliances as % (A/B) 62.1 30.4 
Source: Prepared by the author based on Stolovich (1989), EAAE 2010, press sources, company websites and 
qualified informants. 
The opening and liberalization of trade and financial flows in Uruguay also promoted a growing 
institutional convergence with other countries in the region and around the world too. In this 
way, it would have resulted in a sort of secularization of economic institutions, reducing the 
efficiency of behaviors based on personal power and on direct access to incumbent 
administrations. In the other, an improvement in the supply of technical teams, capable of 
performing efficiently in local level, would be a perfect replacement for economic and political 
power as a supporter to move through the domestic institutional environment. In addition, 
currently a large share of foreign investment comes from within the region. As these 
entrepreneurs have deployed significant capacities to operate in volatile and uncertain contexts, 
the need for a local guide tends to become irrelevant. All these elements could have contributed 
to reduce the incentives to establish new alliances by foreign capital. 
4.5 Sectoral composition of industrial groups 
Regarding to sectoral composition of industrial groups in Uruguay, the first aspect to highlight 
is the decline of manufacturing in business portfolios since 1985 until now. This can be 
appreciated by comparing some central position measures with respect to the number of 
industrial firms over the total of companies in each group. As we pointed out when we referred 
to group size, agricultural firms are likely to be underestimated in the 1985 data. To ensure a 
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more accurate the interpretation, for 2015 we included industrial participation data and 
excluded the agricultural firms. 
Table 10. Industrialization level (industrial companies / total companies of each group) 
 1985 2015 2015* 
Average of the relative sharing of the industry in the groups 0.55 0.35 0.44 
Median of the relative sharing of the industry in the groups 0.57 0.29 0.40 
* no groups with rural businesses 
Source: Own elaboration based on Stolovich, Rodríguez and Bértola (1987) and Geymonat (2019). 
Even after removing the predisposition that can be the difference in the accounting of 
agricultural firms, it clear that in 2015 industrial groups are less than those of the 1980s decade. 
In the one hand, the groups can follow the general behavior of the economic structure, when 
the manufacturing sector has declined, they had too, but they don’t dissolve their structure. On 
the other, we can see that growth of industrial groups with investments in agricultural activities 
has increased. The large margins of cases without data complicate a full conclusion in this 
regard. However, assuming that in both periods the set of cases the tendency is distributed 
equally, showing that groups combined relative sharing in the industrial and agricultural sectors 
to increase as we can see in Table 11. 






With agricultural companies (at least one) 50.0 60.4 
Without agricultural companies 28.8 15.5 
Cases without data 21.2 24.1 
Total 100.0 100.0 
Source: Own elaboration based on Stolovich, Rodríguez and Bértola (1987) and Geymonat (2019). 
To a large extent, this increase may be associated with two phenomena. First, to diversification 
towards primary activities that became increasingly important during the period of study, and 
which always is represented as the country´s "safe" productive advantages. Against the 
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backdrop of a major branch transformations and the growing of uncertainties in this regard, the 
strategy to maintain or invest in primary activities may have been sensible because the country 
has historically depended on them. Secondly, investment in "land" is often used as a kind of 
financial asset, and a haven for accumulating capital. 
Finally, is particularly important remarks that industrial groups and national business groups in 
general departure the national financial system. This divorce is associated to a deeply rooted 
process. Since the 1960s, the number of business groups linked to bank ownership had been 
declining (Stolovich, Rodríguez and Bértola 1987). In 1980, 22% of the groups studied 
participated in the ownership of a bank. After the 2002 crisis, all private banking sold their 
assets to foreign investors. The loss of relevance of business groups in the financial system it 
left them in a position of vulnerability and subordination with respect to foreign private banks 
and public banking.6 
As banking became entirely foreign owned in last ten years, the financing strategies of the 
national groups has been upended. For this additional reason the groups investing in "safe" 
assets, such as land or another type of Real Estate. At the same way, they have opting to sell 
part of their companies to foreigners as a quick via to recapitalize them and to obtain cash. Both 
ways became important to the subsistence of groups. 
4.6. Governmental connections 
Large national groups have maintained close ties with the political system. During the 
emergence and expansion of ISI, large company owners and business organizations were 
integrated into the management of several key government entities, such as public banking, or 
                                                          
6 Other mechanisms, such as the Montevideo Stock Exchange, have not played a dynamic role in the capital 
market. 
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the Export and Import Commission7. Business groups were able to co-opt some of the economic 
engineering of the time (for example, setting tariffs or multiple exchange rates), using it as a 
mechanism to obtain particular benefits (Zurbriggen 2006). Although this type of participation 
changed over time (Trías 1961, 1971; Stolovich and Rodríguez 1987), business groups have 
maintained their presence in the arena of politic and they still closing to Government control.  
Until the 1980s, entrepreneurs influencing specific policies through individual or collective 
lobbying. The most prominent example was the increase of effective tariff protection (Rama 
1990). However, given the economic opening and liberalization policies in which the country 
had been boarded, this mechanism disappeared as a general strategy. The Government had to 
establish clear rules and face the necessity of social cost to enforce them, under the condition 
that institutions would act on growth and development processes. This is the scenario that 
should be interpreted of how the reforms passed by the National Party in the 1990s. During the 
process of correspondent administration, in any case, members of the economic power were 
government officials (Stolovich and Rodríguez 1987). 
After 2005, during the center-left government administrations, the proportion of representatives 
from big national capital have been largely reduced in occupy government seats. This apparent 
development conceals a larger and possibly a more persistent phenomena, which is related to 
the different kinds of relationships between economic powerful and Government. They have 
evolved from an attempt to use the State as part of an income strategy to an increasingly 
impersonal rapport, based on general common rules, and with a lower level of particularization 
(Viñales 2019). The possibility of generating isolated particular conditions (specific tariffs, 
                                                          
7 Export and import control were entrusted to a Government regulatory entity that included to national 
businessmen. Its fundamental mandate consisted in controlling currency flow and setting import sectoral volumes, 
as well as preferential exchange rates (García Repetto 2017). 
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subsidies, etc.) is detrimental to the institutional sense of the model. Business lobbying as a 
practice is now very limited; it does not go away but is reduced in the face of a more general 
and impersonal system. It is clear that part of the economic promotion legislation and 
instruments grant specific benefits to companies. An example of this is the Investment 
Promotion Act,8 but the access mechanism to this kind of benefits is standardized, and its 
successive reforms have tended to reduce –although not always effectively– its biases. 
5. Conclusions 
This paper provides evidence on a subject that has been marginally addressed by Uruguayan 
economic history. Although its main contribution is descriptive, part of this dynamic 
description requires explaining its variation. In this sense, in this paper we have introduced 
some attempted explanations, which remain hypotheses for future research.   
During the period under study, national business groups constitute a structure with broad 
capacities to mitigate adverse and volatile context effects. A proof of this seems to be its 
business portfolio reconversion to the tune of the change undergone by the general economic 
structure. Internally, industrial business groups are less industrial than in the 1980s, 
concentrating a good part of their business in other sectors. Their agrarian base –land portfolios 
investments and agricultural activities– seems to have increased during the period, also in line 
with context incentives. 
In general terms, during the period business groups tended to concentrate control and ownership 
of their companies, doing away with alliances, to a large extent. On the other hand, in companies 
where the confluence of several groups in control or ownership is maintained, the motivation 
                                                          
8 An instrument granting tax exemptions to investing companies. 
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of this alliance also changes. The need to reach specific levels of capital accumulation to operate 
at a certain productive scale in one sector displaces other motivations, such as the need to 
control strategic inputs and services. A new institutional and technical context, which brought 
about a reduction in transaction costs, operates as a disincentive to this type of internalization. 
Given their dwindling presence in the financial system, and in a context of pronounced 
economic growth (for the historical characteristics of Uruguayan economy), business groups 
have tended to specialize their activities in fewer value chains than during the 1980s. The 
possibility of recycling surpluses while getting rid of lagging businesses, as well as the sale of 
some companies to foreign capital as a source of liquidity, is part of the explanation for this 
phenomenon.    
But the groups have also maintained some structural aspects, including their average size and 
their forms of organization and control. These aspects can also be explained by determinations 
of the institutional context. The stagnation in the growth of the groups is due to the scale 
limitations of the Uruguayan economy, as well as to the difficulties that national entrepreneurs 
have encountered in the framework of an economic opening process. The inflow of foreign 
capital into key sectors of the economy has deepened this backwardness of the national ones. 
In this framework, there are no real needs for groups to adopt more complex forms of 
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